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ABSTRACT 
 
 Padang, West Sumatra, Indonesia is considered to have one of the highest tsunami 
risks in the world. Currently, the strategy to prepare for a tsunami in Padang is 
focused on developing early warning systems, planning evacuation routes, 
conducting evacuation drills, and educating the public about its tsunami risk. 
Although these are all necessary efforts, they are not sufficient. Padang is located 
so close to the Sunda Trench and has such flat terrain that a large portion of its 
populace will not be able to reach safe ground in the interval—less than 30 
minutes—between the time the earthquake shaking stops and the tsunami arrives 
at the shore. It is estimated that over 100,000 inhabitants of Padang will be unable 
to evacuate in that time, even if they head for safe ground immediately following 
the earthquake. Given these circumstances, other means to prepare for the 
expected tsunami must be developed. With this motivation, GeoHazards 
International and Stanford University partnered with Indonesian organizations—
Andalas University in Padang, the Laboratory for Earth Hazards (LIPI), and the 
Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP)—in an effort to evaluate the need 
for and feasibility of developing Padang’s tsunami evacuation infrastructure. This 
project team designed and conducted a course at Stanford University, undertook 
several field investigations in Padang, and participated in a reconnaissance trip 
following the September 30, 2009 earthquake. The team concluded that: 1) the 
tsunami-generating earthquake is still a threat, despite the recent M7.6 
earthquake; 2) Padang’s tsunami evacuation capacity is currently inadequate, and 
evacuation structures need to be implemented as part of an effective evacuation 
plan; 3) it is likely that previous estimates of the number of people unable to 
evacuate in time are grossly low; and 4) a more engineering-based approach is 
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needed to evaluate the appropriateness of existing buildings to serve as evacuation 
sites.  
   
Introduction 
 
 This paper is a product of the GeoHazards International (GHI) and Stanford University 
study, conducted in collaboration with Indonesian partners, which began in the fall of 2008.  
Several of the team members also participated in the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute 
(EERI) reconnaissance trip following the September 30, 2009 earthquake near Padang. That trip 
was a crucial factor in reaching the conclusions presented in this paper. This study is an ongoing 
effort, and both GHI and Stanford University are currently working on continuing tsunami risk 
reduction efforts in Padang.    
 
Tsunami Risk in Padang 
 
 In 2004, the Great Indian Ocean Tsunami devastated northern Sumatra and in particular, 
Sumatra’s northernmost city, Banda Aceh. That tsunami killed more than half the population in 
Banda Aceh and changed the geography of the area. Padang, West Sumatra, Indonesia faces a 
similar hazard from the same fault that generated the 2004 tsunami. Unfortunately, Padang has 
almost four times the population of pre-tsunami Banda Aceh. Padang, the capital of West 
Sumatra Province and the most populated city in that province, is now recognized as having one 
of the highest risks of tsunamis in the world. Padang has a high tsunami hazard due to the 
offshore megathrust fault–the Sunda Trench–and has a particularly high exposure to this hazard. 
  
 
Tsunami Hazard in Padang 
 
 Starting in 2004, a series of tsunami-generating earthquakes has occurred on the Sunda 
Trench. As can be seen in Figure 1, a seismic gap exists along the northern segment of the 
Mentawai patch, which is located directly offshore Padang. This particular segment of the Sunda 
Trench is believed to generate a tsunami approximately every 200 years, with the last supercycle 
in 1797 (5-10 m tsunami in Padang) and 1833 (3-4 m tsunami in Padang) (Natawidjaja 2006). 
Scientific studies, including paleoseismic data, GPS measurements, and sediment deposits, 
support this conclusion (Sieh 2008). It is estimated that the tsunami-generating earthquake can 
measure up to M8.8 and will occur sometime within the next few decades (Sieh 2008). The 
tsunami wave will arrive roughly 20 minutes after the earthquake and will reach its maximum 
wave height at 30 minutes (Natawidjaja 2006).  
 
 
 
Figure 1.    (Left) Map of Sumatra illustrating the offshore Sunda Trench and inland Sumatra 
Fault.  (Right) Map showing locations of recent events along the Sunda Trench 
offshore Sumatra. Note that the northern segment of the Mentawai patch remains 
locked, creating a seismic gap directly offshore Padang.  Image Source: K. Sieh.   
 
Exposure in Padang 
 
 Padang literally means “field” in Bahasa Indonesia, the national language. Its terrain 
reflects its name: Padang has 3-4 km of flat land, before rising toward hills further inland. As 
with many coastal towns, Padang’s major roads run parallel to the coast, making evacuation 
inland difficult. Several parts of the city, and numerous areas along West Sumatra’s coast, have 
bodies of water that run parallel to the coast and that therefore impede people from evacuating 
inland. Most of these areas have few bridges, and the earthquake-resistance of existing bridges is 
questionable; they might not be usable immediately after an earthquake, when people are trying 
to evacuate from the approaching tsunami.   
 
 In addition to its vulnerable terrain, Padang’s population density and distribution make 
the situation even more concerning.  Padang is a city of 900,000 people, half of whom live close 
to the coast and within a five-meter elevation above sea level. Many of the people living right at 
the coast are poor fishermen, making relocation a difficult alternative, because these families 
depend upon the ocean for their survival. Padang’s city center, located along the south end of the 
city, is a bustling shopping area filled with shops and offices. The population density in this 
region is about 9,000 people per km2, a population density similar to Mexico City. The 
population density and distribution, in combination with the terrain, make Padang particularly 
vulnerable to tsunamis.    
Preparedness Efforts in Padang 
 
 Padang was designated one of six cities in Indonesia to undertake earthquake and tsunami 
risk reduction activities, after the tsunami of 2004. In Padang, many of those efforts have focused 
on developing tsunami early warning systems, planning evacuation routes, educating the local 
people about their risk, and conducting tsunami evacuation drills.  The early warning systems 
consist of a network of buoys offshore and of seismometers that collect data, in order to 
immediately determine an earthquake’s characteristics and whether or not it could generate a 
tsunami. People are also being taught to evacuate immediately, if the natural signs of a potential 
tsunami are present. These include ground shaking that:  1) lasts more than one minute; 2) is so 
strong that it is difficult to stand; and 3) causes visible building damage. Evacuation routes have 
been developed, but several studies indicate that the current road and bridge system is grossly 
insufficient to evacuate the entire city.   
 
 Numerous tsunami inundation maps of Padang have been developed by expert scientists, 
both internationally and within Indonesia. Unfortunately, each map was developed using 
different assumptions, models and data, which has resulted in inundation maps that vary 
significantly. The complexity of determining the “best” map has resulted in the city simply using 
a topography map to plan its evacuation. The city is currently divided into different levels of 
tsunami vulnerability, according to elevation above sea level: Red Zone (0-5 meters), Yellow 
Zone (5-10 meters), and Green Zone (>10 meters).      
 
 Although all these efforts are necessary, they are unfortunately not sufficient. It is 
estimated that over 100,000 people would still be unable to evacuate in time, if a tsunami were to 
occur today.  This number, in fact, might be a lower bound, since the simulations used to 
generate this estimate made questionable assumptions about people’s behavior during evacuation 
and did not account for post-earthquake conditions, such as road blockages due to building 
debris.         
 
Evacuation Structures 
 
There are several ongoing efforts to incorporate tsunami evacuation structures into 
Padang’s evacuation plan, in order to address the inadequacy of the current plan. Tsunami 
evacuation structures can be generalized into the following categories:  
 
• Refuge structures can be any type of structure that is designed to rise above the expected 
tsunami inundation level and to withstand the expected earthquake and tsunami forces. 
These types of structures provide what is referred to as “vertical evacuation.”  The 
options for refuge structures can vary widely: they can be new or existing buildings, 
evacuation towers, soil berms, elevated highways or pedestrian overpasses.  Examples of 
these can be seen in Figure 2.  
 
• Bridge structures only need to be earthquake-resistant and to serve as an element of an 
evacuation route. These structures facilitate what is referred to as “horizontal 
evacuation.”  They can help people to evacuate inland or to high ground, as shown in 
Figure 2.   
 
 
 
Figure 2.    Examples of tsunami evacuation structures.  (Top left) Tsunami evacuation building 
in Banda Aceh, built after the 2004 tsunami.  This building’s secondary purpose is to 
serve as a community center.  (Bottom Left) Pre-fabricated structure in Japan with the 
sole purpose of serving as an evacuation site during a tsunami.  (Top right) Aerial 
photo of a bridge in Padang that provides access to high ground from the city center.  
(Bottom Right) A soil berm in Japan that provides refuge during tsunamis.  Image 
sources: ATC-64.   
 
New Government Regulation 
 
The local government in Padang passed a law after the 2004 tsunami, indicating that all 
buildings that are over two stories high can be used as evacuation sites during a tsunami event. 
Although this law is a good start, several problems remain. First, this regulation has not been 
communicated well to the public and to building owners. Most people remain unaware of this 
regulation. Second, it is questionable whether most two-story buildings in Padang could actually 
serve as safe evacuation sites. The structural integrity of many buildings in Padang is likely 
insufficient to withstand tsunami forces, let alone the earthquake forces prior to the tsunami.    
 
Existing Building Surveys 
 
There have been recent efforts to evaluate existing buildings, in order to identify those 
that would be adequate for vertical evacuation. This is especially crucial in Padang, because the 
government has limited resources, and using structures that are currently available is more 
economically feasible than building new evacuation structures. There have been several studies 
to date on the suitability of existing buildings in Padang to serve as evacuation structures. A brief 
description of each study follows. 
 
• Provincial Government List. This is a list of “important, tall buildings in Padang” that 
was compiled by the provincial government sometime around 2006.  No other 
evaluations were conducted.   
• Andalas University List. This building survey was carried out in collaboration with a 
German organization. The survey “graded” 513 buildings under four categories– 
earthquake-resistance, tsunami-resistance, accessibility, and liquefaction potential–by 
conducting quick visual assessments and by taking some measurements of element sizes 
and material strength. In this survey, only three buildings received good scores for all 
four categories.     
• Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) List.  This list of recommended buildings 
was compiled using the two lists described above and following a similar procedure to 
the Andalas University List. However, this list also excluded: 1) buildings within 200 
meters of the coast; 2) buildings with two floors within 500 meters of the coast; 3) private 
company buildings; 4) warehouses; 5) home-shops (rukos); 6) hospitals/clinics; and 7) 
houses. This list has a total number of 44 recommended buildings. 
• German-Indonesian Tsunami Early Warning System (GITEWS) List.  The recommended 
buildings on this list were included as preliminary candidates for evacuation on 
evacuation maps developed in 2009.  These recommendations were based on past 
building surveys conducted by KKP and Andalas University.   
• Laboratory of Earth Hazards (LIPI) List.  This building survey was being initiated in the 
summer of 2009 and is currently incomplete.  The survey follows a similar procedure to 
that of the Andalas University List.  No building recommendations have yet been made 
by LIPI.             
• GHI-Stanford Survey. This survey was conducted during the summer of 2009; buildings 
were chosen based on the lists described above.  This study focused more on determining 
building seismic deficiencies when compared to the previous surveys. No building 
recommendations have been developed yet from this survey.     
 
These building surveys provide a good start towards identifying existing buildings that 
could serve as evacuation sites; however, much work remains to be done. The surveys are quick 
assessments and do not adequately address potential seismic deficiencies of the buildings, which 
is crucial to determining whether or not they are appropriate as evacuation structures.   
 
September 30, 2009 Earthquake and Evacuation 
 
 On September 30, 2009 at 5:16 PM, a M7.6 earthquake struck Indonesia approximately 
50 km W–NW of Padang. The earthquake occurred within the Indian-Australian plate but was 
too deep (80 km) to generate a tsunami. This earthquake had relatively few aftershocks, but on 
the next day, a M6.6 earthquake occurred on the inland Sumatran fault located 215 km southeast 
of Padang.  Unfortunately, only one strong motion sensor collected data. This equipment, which 
was located at the foothills and further inland, recorded a peak ground acceleration of 0.3g. 
However, most of Padang sits closer to the coast and on soft soil, so it is expected that the 
ground motion there was probably closer to 0.4 – 0.6g.            
  
Tsunami Evacuation 
 
 Tsunami education efforts have definitely spread throughout Padang, and most people 
now know that strong earthquake shaking is a natural warning of a potential tsunami. According 
to a government official, over 90% of the people in the high inundation area evacuated after the 
earthquake. However, there were still numerous problems with the evacuation plan. People are 
taught to evacuate immediately after earthquake shaking, a procedure people do follow during 
evacuation drills. However, people did not do this during the earthquake.  They delayed 
evacuating for various reasons–to help injured people or people under trapped buildings, and/or 
to go home to check on their families. Most people also used their vehicles, although they had 
been told not to do so during an evacuation. This caused people to be stuck in massive traffic 
jams for 1-2 hours. Some people in traffic became so frustrated that they abandoned their cars 
and fled on foot, making the traffic congestion even worse. This is especially concerning when 
one considers that, had a tsunami occurred, it would have arrived in Padang 20-30 minutes after 
the earthquake.   
 
 There was very little evidence of vertical evacuation, with one exception. Andi Syukri, an 
Andalas University student, evacuated to Masjid Taqwa, one of the major mosques in Padang, 
right after the earthquake and indicated that about 100 people evacuated to the mosque in fear of 
a tsunami.           
 
Performance of Evacuation Structures  
 
Roads and Bridges 
 
The roads and bridges leading to “safe ground” (either inland or to high ground) did not 
suffer heavy damage, but the already narrow roads became even more constricted, due to 
building debris. A recent study by Professor Febrin from Andalas University showed that the 
evacuation demand on these roads is too high, even if the roads are clear of debris.  One of the 
major bridges connecting part of the dense area of the city to high ground did suffer some 
damage. As can be seen in Figure 3, the damage is in the approach to the bridge and not to the 
bridge structure itself. Although this bridge will need substantial repair, the damage was not 
sufficient to have presented major problems with evacuation, had a tsunami occurred.   
    
 
 
Figure 3.    (Left) Map indicating location of one of the major bridges connecting the dense city 
center to high ground.  (Right) Photos of earthquake damage to the south end of the 
bridge approach.  Image source: EERI.     
 
Buildings 
 
Buildings that had been previously recommended as potential tsunami evacuation sites 
varied in performance.  Many suffered heavy structural and nonstructural damage, while a few 
completely collapsed. This wide spectrum of performance demonstrates the need for a more 
thorough analysis of buildings, before any are recommended as evacuation sites. Although some 
of the building’s structural system remained intact, nonstructural damage was so intense that 
most people would have felt unsafe going inside. Therefore, their use as evacuation sites 
remained ineffective. Of the 31 potential evacuation buildings visited by the EERI 
reconnaissance team, 1/3 were found to have collapsed or were heavily damaged, and roughly ¾ 
of the buildings had sufficient damage still to be closed two weeks after the earthquake.  Figure 4 
shows before and after photos of some of these buildings. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.    Before and after photos of buildings that had been recommended as evacuation sites. 
 From left to right:  Four story mall, partial collapse on the 4th floor and fire; 4-story 
language school, collapse of first 2 stories; 4-story junior college, complete collapse.  
Image source: EERI.  
     
Good Candidates for Evacuation Sites 
 
 After the earthquake, there were few structures that could have served well as evacuation 
sites had a tsunami occurred.  Below are two examples.   
  
Bank Indonesia 
  
Bank Indonesia is a bank office complex with three concrete frame buildings. It is a good 
candidate for tsunami evacuation, because the complex is large, located on an elevated site, and 
has an outdoor terrace that is 20 meters above sea level. The complex also has on-site security, 
ensuring that access during a tsunami could be arranged. Two of the newer buildings suffered 
only minor to moderate nonstructural damage due to the earthquake.  This building was 
designated by the Padang government as a tsunami evacuation site.  However, according to a 
security guard, the general population did not seek refuge in the bank complex, and most people 
who were inside the building during the earthquake evacuated and tried to go inland.   
 
Masjid Taqwa 
 
 Masjid Taqwa is a large, three-story mosque that was constructed around 1979. The 
mosque is located near the central market in the heart of the city center. There was no visible 
structural damage to the building after the earthquake, only minor non-structural damage, chiefly 
to the minaret and parapets.  Roughly 100 people evacuated to the mosque following the 
earthquake, because they were afraid that a tsunami might strike. 
 
 In general, large, multi-story mosques are good candidates for tsunami evacuation sites, 
because: 1) they have a large, open prayer area that can accommodate a large number of people; 
2) they tend to have a lot of columns, making them redundant structures; 3) they tend to be of 
better construction quality than other structures; 4) they are designed to be accessible to a large 
number of people; and 5) people tend to go to mosques after disasters, due to the religious nature 
of the culture.   
 
Conclusions 
 
 The following is a summary of conclusions drawn, based on observations and lessons 
learned from the GHI-Stanford study and from the September 30, 2009 Earthquake 
reconnaissance trip:   
1) A tsunami-generating earthquake is still a threat. The recent earthquake was too deep to 
cause a tsunami and did not release accumulated stress on the Sunda Trench.     
2) Padang’s tsunami evacuation capacity is currently inadequate, and evacuation structures 
need to be incorporated into the evacuation plan. As past studies have concluded and as 
the recent earthquake demonstrated, horizontal evacuation is not sufficient for the city of 
Padang. Therefore, it is crucial to develop other means of evacuation.   
3) It is likely that previous estimates of the number of people who will be unable to evacuate 
are grossly low, given that most of these studies did not account for the real, post-
earthquake conditions demonstrated during the September 30 event.  Past 
models/simulations did not account for debris in the road and lack of visibility from dust 
and particles from collapsed buildings. Those models/simulations also assumed that: a) 
people would not use their vehicles for evacuation; b) people would evacuate 
immediately following the earthquake; and c) people could use certain buildings for 
evacuation, many of which proved to be inadequate under earthquake loading alone.  
4) A more engineering-based approach is needed to evaluate the appropriateness of existing 
buildings to serve as evacuation sites.  The wide spectrum of performance of potential 
evacuation buildings during this recent earthquake demonstrates the need for a more 
thorough analysis of buildings, before they are recommended as evacuation sites.    
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